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Anette Borchorst  
Daddy Leave and Gender Equality  
– the Danish Case in a Scandinavian Perspective 
 
 
Introduction 
In 2002, the two weeks’ daddy leave in the Danish parental leave was 
abolished after an intensive debate in the media from March to July 
2001, and at the same time the parental leave was extended from 26 to 
52 weeks.  The decision was passed by parties from the right wing 
government, which had just taken office.  The parental leave had not 
been placed high on the political agenda for many years, and the 
politication was triggered by the fact that the debate constituted a 
prelude to the electoral campaign preceding the parliamentary election 
in November 2001.  Earmarking part of the leave for the fathers 
turned out to be a very controversial issue during the debate.   
 
The daddy leave, which was not transferable to the mother, had been 
adopted four years prior by a Social Democratic-Social Liberal 
government together with the left, and it had the intended outcome.  
From 1998-2001, the take-up rate of fathers increased from 7 to 24%, 
contrary to the very modest take-up rate of fathers during the 10 week 
period which could be shared by the father and the mother in parental 
leave from 1984-2000.  During this period, only 5% of the fathers 
opted for leave.  Compared to this, the earmarking was a veritable 
success, and yet, it was not portrayed as such in the media.  This has 
to do with the success of the right wing parties, and above all the 
Agrarian Liberals, which triggered the debate, to frame earmarking 
negatively as government interference in the private affairs of the 
family.   
 
In this way, a public-private dichotomy that had played a modest role 
in Danish politics for many decades was rearticulated.  The centre and 
left did not frame the daddy leave positively as entitlements of fathers, 
and they did not manage to activate a debate on the impact of the 
gendered construction of the leave.  In this way, the gendered 
practices were reduced to being a matter of individual choices of 
fathers and mothers.  The debate was not moved beyond arguments 
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about the choices of the individual mothers and fathers, whereby the 
significance of the structural aspects of the parental leave such as its 
gendered constructions and impact on for instance employers’ 
attitudes on men opting for parental leave was not brought into the 
focus. 
 
The failure of the Centre-Left to challenge the rhetoric of the Right 
may be explained by the fact that several of the parties, including the 
Social Democrats, were internally divided on the issue.  On a more 
general level, the case reflects that the political game among other 
things is played out as a contest over meaning.  In this particular case, 
it was reinforced by the fact that a call of election was expected.  
Surprisingly many politicians participated and much of the debate, 
which would normally take place in the parliament, took place in the 
media.  The debate on parental leave also exposed a particular Danish 
policy paradox regarding gender equality as a policy logic.  Gender 
equality is a strong informal norm, but a weak explicit policy norm.  
Denmark has for many decades been in the forefront in terms of 
expanding public childcare facilities, and it has had record high 
coverage with childcare facilities for pre school children, which has 
been very significant for facilitating women’s paid work.  On the other 
hand, policies of gender equality have been relatively weak and 
confined to a policy niche.  They relate primarily to formal 
antidiscrimination in the labour market and have been kept separated 
from welfare- and childcare policies, which by and large have had a 
gender-neutral underpinning. 
   
Strategies for achieving gender equality have above all been aimed at 
facilitating women’s breadwinning, and this has been accomplished 
by expanding welfare policies.  The role of Danish men as carers and 
fathers within marriage has not been politicised to the same extent as 
in Sweden and Norway, where the integration of fathers in caring 
responsibilities was placed high on the governmental agenda in the 
late 1980s and the1990s.  Danish fathers’ entitlement to parental leave 
was granted in 1984, which was 10 years later than in Sweden and 7 
years later than in Norway.  The daddy leave was also introduced later 
in Denmark, and at the time earmarking leave for fathers was 
abolished in Denmark, it was extended in the two other countries.  
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In this chapter, I focus on the background for the decision to abolish 
the Danish daddy quota in 2001.  First, I approach problem definition, 
agenda setting, path dependence and social constructivism as 
approaches to public policy making.  Next, I address the timing of 
different policies influencing changes in the position of women from 
the 1960s and onwards more generally, and subsequently I deal with 
childcare policies and policies of gender equality in particular.  After 
this, I briefly provide a long historical perspective on parliamentary 
negotiations on maternity and paternity leave from 1901 till the late 
1990s, after which I analyse the decisions to adopt a daddy leave in 
1997 and abolish it 2001.  Finally, I discuss Danish gender equality 
paradoxes.   
 
 
Agenda setting and contest over meaning 
Policy analysts have for many years engaged in discussions about 
what determines policy output.  During the last two-three decades, 
new approaches have gained ground, challenging above all the idea 
that policy makers react to objective conditions, and that they do it in 
a rational way.  Problems do not exist objectively; they are portrayals 
of people’s experiences and interpretations (Stone, 1988).  Issues may 
get to the political agenda for all sorts of reasons, and the politicians 
do not consider all alternative solutions.  Many scholars have directed 
their attention to agenda setting and problem definition as decisive for 
decisions.  Another important point is that policies are time bound and 
deeply shaped by context and varying economic, political and 
discursive opportunity structures.  Timing is therefore important.  At 
particular moments, policy windows may open, for instance due to 
political events and specific problems that surface and attracts public 
attention (Kingdon, 1984).   
 
Historical institutionalists ascribe specific significance to the 
particular historical path of policies.  Actors can play a key role at a 
certain time, but institutionalisation of organisational structures, 
policy logics and discourses may imply that policies follow the path 
that was initially chosen.  The concept path dependence is an 
indication of this.  It leads to the rather broad conclusion that ‘history 
matters’, and the intriguing question is what mechanisms create it, and 
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what causes path-breaking elements in politics (Thelen & Steinmo, 
1992; Thelen, 1999). 
 
Another somewhat different but compatible approach stems from the 
influx of social constructivism on policy analysis.  Is has been labelled 
‘the argumentative turn’ in policy analysis, and it focuses on how 
political problems are interpreted and how they are discussed (Fischer 
& Forester, 1993).  This tradition also challenges the idea that political 
issues exist as objective phenomena.  Policy making involves a 
constant discursive struggle over criteria and framing of issues, and 
the way they are framed attributes meaning to them.  Some aspects are 
brought to public attention, others are downplayed, and competing 
problem interpretations often coexist.  The terms of the political 
discourses have become a dimension of politics in itself, and political 
parties use arguments strategically to make some interpretations 
dominate and outcompete others. 
 
Comparisons of political debates in different countries may expose 
considerable differences in, when and how political issues reach the 
political agenda, and the framing of political problems are often 
surprisingly different.  Bacchi, who focuses on the problem definition 
regarding women’s inequality in the US, Canada and Australia (1999), 
demonstrates that there are considerable differences in the way pay 
equity, abortion, childcare and four other areas have been constructed 
as political problems, and this has been significant for the different 
policies that have been adopted. 
 
A central issue for determining specific policies of parenting and 
gender equality is what is framed as a public concern, and what is 
defined as private, which the state should not interfere in.  The 
outcome of discursive battles on this distinction mirrors patterns of 
gendered power and dominance relations (Fraser, 1989: 166ff.). 
   
In my empirical work on what has shaped public policies of particular 
influence for the gendered construction of parenting, I have applied all 
the abovementioned approaches, and I have kept the question of 
decisive mechanisms for policy outputs empirically open.  The 
following sections are based on my findings.   
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Changes in family structures and women’s position in the 1960s 
and 1970s  
The golden age of the male breadwinner family model lasted only 15 
years in Denmark.  From the early 1960s it was undermined by a 
number of interrelated changes in family structures, which may be 
summarized as follows: The relative number of married women in 
paid work grew from ¼ to ½ during the 1960s, and fertility took a 
sharp downturn from 1966.  Marriages decreased drastically from the 
mid-1960s, and divorces accelerated in the late 1960s and during the 
first half of the 1970s (Borchorst & Dahlerup, 2003: 199).   
 
The timing of events may be explained by changes in the economic 
opportunity structures.  The women’s rights organisations had for 
several decades promoted education and integration in paid work as 
the optimal route to gender equality.  They did not, however, gain 
much support for this strategy immediately after the war due to the 
cold war climate and the economic recession.  Public committees 
recommended collectivization of housework and public policies to 
support a dual earner family model, but these ideas remained dormant 
throughout the 1950s.  The economic opportunity structure changed 
with the boom in the Danish economy in the early 1960s, and the 
unmet demand for labour produced a shift in attitudes towards 
women’s participation in gainful employment.  Yet, it does not fully 
explain the scope of the changes, which stretched into a period of 
economic downturn in the first half of the 1970s.   
 
Political and discursive opportunity structures were also subject to 
considerable changes.  The expansion of welfare policies and the 
significance of the new feminist movement in the 1960s and 70s 
paved the way for a historical shift in gender perceptions and 
hegemonic norms (Dahlerup, 1998), and this was interlinked with the 
increasing secularization that characterized the country.  Initially, 
competing discourses on the proper position of women triggered a 
heated debate, not least among women.  A recurrent theme was who 
should care for pre-school children.  In the 1950s and the early 1960s, 
women were framed as bad mothers if they engaged in paid work; 10 
years later this position had lost ground, and working mothers had 
become the hegemonic norm (Biza et al, 1982). 
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The extension of the educational system generated irreversible 
changes from mothers to daughters, and tax policy reforms mitigated 
economic hindrances to gainful employment for married women.  
When the Danish economy was struck by the increasing oil prices in 
the early 1970s, and unemployment started to rise, inclusion of part-
time workers in the unemployment insurance system represented 
another hindrance to sending women back to the family as 
housewives.   
 
The integration of women into the labour force was facilitated by 
changes in reproductive policies.  The pill was released in 1966, and 
this and other types of contraceptives enhanced women’s bodily 
autonomy.  Furthermore, abortion within 12 weeks of pregnancy 
became legalised in 1973, and it was offered as part of the public tax-
financed health system.  Of particular significance for breadwinning 
as a lifelong perspective for women was the strengthening of 
maternity leave entitlements and the expansion of public childcare 
facilities. 
   
Before I focus on the debates on parental leave, I will deal with the 
timing, content and framing of childcare policies and policies of 
gender equality. 
 
 
Universalist childcare provision 
The competing images of ideal family structures were reflected in the 
political debates in the early 1960s.  Childcare was subject to 
somewhat contradictory framing.  Leading social democrats saw the 
family as a solution to consequences of rapid technological and 
economic changes, and initiatives were taken to adopt a coherent 
family policy founded on traditional family patterns.  Policy 
recommendations suggested that mothers should take care for their 
own children, at least for the first three years.  During the same period, 
it was widely debated whether childcare facilities were beneficial to 
children or not.  Several attempts to ask experts to settle the matter 
generated ambiguous conclusions.  Traditional family policy 
promoting a male breadwinner family model, however, never gained 
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ground in Denmark, which until 2004, only had a ministry of family 
affairs for 1½ years.   
 
It was decisive that the first steps towards preparing changes in the 
legislation on childcare facilities were taken already in 1961 
(Borchorst, 2002).  In 1964, the universalist principle was instituted in 
the childcare legislation.  The 1964 act marked a radical shift in state 
efforts dedicated to subsidizing childcare.  Residual measures targeted 
at needy families were replaced by universal measures aimed at 
children from all social groups.  The change involved a whole new set 
of values concerning care for infants.  Whereas the staff had 
previously been preoccupied with hygiene and regularity, and the 
legislation had dealt with preventive child welfare, the cornerstone 
was now social pedagogic childcare offers, founded on the integration 
of care and education.  The key objective of the facilities now 
focussed on play and social interaction.  The diffusion of these ideas 
was nurtured by the introduction of a three-year education for 
childcare pedagogues in 1969.   
 
Recommendations from progressive pedagogues, who had for many 
decades served as experts and advisors to public authorities, greatly 
influenced the content and framing of the decisions.  The women’s 
rights organizations were also active in promoting the issue on the 
political agenda.  Among the political parties, the Social Democrats 
and the left in particular induced the policy change, but it is 
noteworthy that all political parties in parliament supported the act.  
Though satisfying the need for labour was an important incentive, 
especially for the right wing parties, the overall policy logic was child 
centred.  The problem definition of the legislation was related to the 
needs of small children, not the lack of economic independence for 
women or the demand of labour.   
 
The number of childcare facilities grew steadily from 1966, and 
coverage ratios increased and have remained among the highest in 
Western Europe, particularly for 0-3 year-olds (OECD, 2001).  
Childcare represents one of the few areas where Denmark was at the 
forefront of the Scandinavian development, and it is partly explained 
by the path dependence of the policies.   
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The state’s commitment to support childcare was introduced in 1919, 
and this was earlier than most other governments started to subsidise 
childcare.  It was generated by a unique coalition of progressive 
pedagogues and leading Social Democrats in Copenhagen.  This 
responsiveness to forces in civil society characterized many welfare 
policies in Denmark.  From early on, policies were founded on the 
integration of care and education, and private idealistic initiatives 
played a central role in the establishment of facilities.  The public 
commitment, which was targeted at needy families, was gradually 
extended and strengthened.  In 1949, an element of universalism was 
introduced when support for facilities accommodating children of all 
social backgrounds was allowed.  
  
The 1964 act on childcare therefore exhibits continuity and a radical 
shift at the same time.  The considerable public commitment was 
influenced by the legacy of the 1919 act, the institutionalisation of the 
child-centred policy logic and the cooperation between politicians and 
pedagogues.  The timing of the new act was also of some importance.  
Preparations were started before the position of women was 
politicised, and childcare became a hot issue.   
 
 
Gender equality policy: A political niche 
In the middle of the 1970s, gender equality was established as a new 
policy area.  The development was triggered by international 
initiatives, such as the UN call to establish women’s policy machinery 
and UN’s International Women’s Year in 1975.  The European 
Community also had an impact on the development in Denmark, 
which joined in 1973 as the only Scandinavian country at the time. 
 
The fist step towards instituting gender equality was the establishment 
of a woman’s commission in Denmark in 1965, inspired by similar 
Swedish and Norwegian initiatives.  Whereas the other two countries 
established small powerful commissions, the Danish Social 
Democratic prime minister allowed representation by numerous 
organisations, according to the strong corporatist spirit that prevailed 
in policy making at the time.  The fact that so many vested interests 
were involved hampered the commission’s ability to agree on policy 
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recommendations, and this in turn curtailed its opportunities to 
influence the political agenda.  Moreover, it took 9 years to complete 
its tasks, and by then opportunity structures had altered radically 
(Borchorst & Dahlerup: ch. 3). 
 
The economic downturn and the so-called landslide election in 1973 
transformed Danish politics.  Denmark was hit hard by the oil crisis, 
and unemployment increased drastically.  Furthermore, the election 
transformed Danish politics fundamentally.  It eroded the stable party 
system based on the four old political parties, the Social Democrats, 
the Social Liberals, the Conservatives and the Agrarian Liberals, and 
this undermined the political consensus on which the welfare state had 
been founded and extended during the previous many decades.  Two 
newly formed political parties challenged gender equality as a 
hegemonic political norm.  The Progress Party, a tax denial party on 
the extreme right, obtained considerable representation, and it 
articulated open resistance and ridiculed almost all political decisions 
on gender equality.  The much smaller Christian Democratic Party’s 
pro-family rhetoric emphasized childcare within the family.  The two 
parties did not gain major support on the actual policy making, but 
their presence prompted a shift in the discursive opportunity structure.   
 
Hence, the timing and sequencing of events implied that Denmark was 
much more reluctant to establish gender equality policy machinery 
than Sweden and Norway.  The support for political measures to 
enhance gender equality was modest, especially among the right wing 
parties.  An exception was the Social Liberals, a small but very 
significant party in Danish politics, which has a long tradition for 
promoting gender equality.  Outside parliament, the feminist 
movement, which had adopted a rather hostile attitude towards the 
state, had a considerable influence on the changing discourses.  It put 
pressure on the political parties to address the subordination of 
women.  The right turn in Danish politics did, however, undermine the 
extra-parliamentarian pressure to include gender issues on the political 
agenda (Christensen & Siim, 2001). 
   
The political majority in parliament including the liberal government 
was against establishing a policy machinery for gender equality, but 
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Denmark got one anyhow, when a social democratic prime minister 
acted upon administrative order in 1975 and founded the Equal Status 
Council. As a consequence, its room of manoeuvre was curtailed.  
Until its legal confirmation in 1978 it primarily dealt with inquiries 
and complaints from individuals, and it only engaged in few 
considerations on strategies for achieving gender equality.  The family 
was excluded from its general field of operation, due to the resistance 
of the Christian Democrats, and childcare and other welfare policies 
were kept separated from these policies, too.  Hence, the dominant 
policy logic related to labour market issues and education only, even 
though the reconciliation of family and work constituted a significant 
problem for many women.  Gender equality was very vaguely defined 
in the legislation, and the instruments were selected from a restricted 
repertoire.  Affirmative action and special treatment was allowed, but 
the actual options were very restricted, since it required an exemption 
from the act on equal treatment in each case.  In the 1980s, gender 
equality was strengthened as policy logic, but less than in Sweden and 
Norway which strengthened their policies of gender equality policies 
and the implementation of them (Borchorst, 1999a; b).   
 
There was, however, one attempt to merge welfare- and family policy 
with gender equality.  The Council of Equal Status and the Child 
Commission, which was appointed in 1979, cooperated to strengthen a 
child-centred perspective together and incorporating gender equality 
as a policy logic.  Together, they managed to influence political 
discourses for a while, but the cooperation did not materialise as 
significant policy changes.   
 
During the 1990s, gender as a political category lost further 
momentum in public policies.  Internal turbulence in the Equal Status 
Council and conflicts between feminist organizations and men’s 
groups about the focus on men undermined gender equality as a 
political project.  Policies with extremely gendered outcome such as 
the childcare leave scheme which granted parents a right to leave for 
one year to take care of their children were framed as gender-neutral 
family policies, and they were negotiated with very limited focus on 
gender (Borchorst, 1999c).  Another factor that may explain this 
development is the disappearance of the feminist movement as a 
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strong extra-parliamentarian pressure that influenced discursive 
frames.  It was also apparent that open resistance to gender equality 
measures in the majority population had stretched from the extreme 
right to the Agrarian Liberals and the Conservatives, which had 
previously supported many decisions on gender equality.  To this 
should be added that gender equality plays a very restricted role in the 
political parties in Denmark (Borchorst, 2004). 
 
In sum: The gender-neutral welfare policies adopted during the 1960s 
generated major reforms for women, but gender equality policies from 
the 1970s were weak, and the process towards establishing gender 
equality as a key policy area was punctuated by the fact that the 
economic crisis coincided with the land-slide election and the turn to 
the right.  Attempts to coordinate the objectives of family policies and 
policies of gender equality capsized in the 1980s.  Towards the end of 
the 1990s, they were still strictly separated, and policies concerning 
the adaptation to a dual earner family model were still predominantly 
directed towards women.  Hence the weak and narrow policies of 
gender equality may be explained by path dependency and 
unfavourable opportunity structures.   
 
 
Maternity and paternity leave on the political agenda 1901-19971  
Legislation on parental leave was first subject to regulation in 
Denmark in the factory law of 1901, which introduced two weeks’ 
mandatory maternity leave for female factory workers after an 
intensive debate on special protection of female workers.  A unique 
alliance between bourgeois women’s organizations and female unions 
outside parliament succeeded in preventing a ban on women’s night 
work, and they also managed to persuade the male politicians to open 
for social assistance to women during the maternity leave.  In the 
interwar period, the assistance, which was meanstested, was gradually 
improved, and it was granted to more groups of women.   
 
The following decades saw only modest changes in the legislation, but 
in the early 1960s, path-breaking changes were made.  More groups of 
                                                 
1  The section sums up my own empirical work in Borchorst, 2003, which is based on many different 
sources which are indicated in the references. 
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women employees gained access to benefits during the leave, and in 
1966, statutory rights to parental leave were extended to almost all 
groups of women in the labour market, and the leave was extended to 
14 weeks.  The changes were adopted during a period when many 
welfare benefits were improved; universalist principles were 
strengthened and insurance based criteria were downplayed.  The 
integration of women into the labour force was a central political 
objective, but the improvements of the maternity leave were not 
highly polticised.  
  
Throughout the 1970s, leftist parties and the Social Liberals in 
particular made attempts to include fathers in parental leave 
entitlements.  Outside parliament there was strong and persistent 
pressure from social movements and unions and above all the new 
feminist movement to prolong the leave and entitle fathers to leave.  
The issue was presented as a solution to women’s double workload, 
but also as a benefit for fathers and children.  The extra-
parliamentarian pressure was not successful, however, above all 
because the economy was in bad shape.   
 
The economic downturn implied that the politicians engaged in fierce 
conflicts on which issues should be given priority.  Within the Social 
Democratic party there was a conflict between leading politicians in 
favour of a restoration of Kastrup Airport and female politicians, who 
pushed for the extension of the parental leave.  The political strength 
of the female politicians was weakened by the fact that female trade 
unionists opposed statutory rights for fathers because they found that 
the leave for mothers was too short.  They criticised that the four 
weeks’ pregnancy leave was deducted from the leave after the birth, 
because this was disadvantageous to women with hard physical work.  
They also questioned whether the fathers would actually participate or 
just go fishing if they were granted leave.   
 
Finally in 1984, after numerous unsuccessful proposals, the leave was 
extended from 14 to 24 weeks, and fathers became entitled to 14 days 
after the birth together with the mother.  Furthermore, father and 
mother could share the last ten weeks.  The entitlements of fathers 
were dependent on the status of the mother, and men who had children 
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with students or housewives were not entitled to leave.  This was 
changed in 1991, when fathers gained statutory rights independently 
of their wives and partners.   
 
The debates during the 1990s were characterized by reluctance to deal 
with gender equality objectives.  The stipulation of parental leave 
entitlements had since 1989 been laid down in the equal treatment act.  
This was motivated by technical arguments, since EU directives 
required reversal of the burden of proof in connection with dismissal 
of pregnant women and people opting for parental leave.  It did, 
however, not revoke further reflections on the gendered construction 
of the parental leave neither in 1989 nor in 2001.   
 
By and large, the decisions from 1901-97 had been characterized by 
consensus between the political parties, with the centre and left as the 
most proactive agents for promoting and improving the parental leave. 
 
 
Daddy leave 1997-2001 – from low to high politics2
In 1997, the parental leave was prolonged from 24 to 26 weeks, and 
the decision marked a radical shift in the construction of the leave, 
since the two weeks (25 and 26) were earmarked for fathers.  The 
adoption of a daddy quota was inspired by the Norwegian fedrekvote 
from 1993 and the Swedish pappamånad from 1995, both for four 
weeks (Leira, 2002 and Leira this volume).   
 
The act was passed as part of a centre-left agreement on the budget, 
which did not include the right wing parties.  The right-left fight 
marked the shift from gender equality as a consensual political norm 
among the major political parties, except for the Progress Party at the 
extreme right, which had systematically opposed all decisions on 
gender equality.  Given this left-right cleavage, it is remarkable that 
the right did not politicise the decision and profile their opposition to 
them in parliament nor in the media.  The decision went largely 
unnoticed by the public.  It was subject to a very short parliamentary 
debate and a very restricted debate in the media.  It is not uncommon 
                                                 
2  The section sums up my own empirical work in Borchorst, 2003. This work has been based on many 
different sources which are indicated in the references. 
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that issues that are included in budget agreements are not subject to 
longer debates in parliament, but it is noteworthy that several of the 
issues that triggered a heated debate four years later did not surface, 
when the leave was introduced.   
 
The Social Democratic government coalition framed daddy leave as a 
benefit to the father, the child and the mother and a means to increase 
gender equality.  This win-win interpretation was not challenged by 
the right, which however questioned whether fathers would take up 
the leave.  They suggested that the question should be settled by the 
social partners in collective agreements, in which case extending the 
leave would be financed by the partners themselves through collective 
agreements.  They did not frame the daddy leave as an interference 
with the free choice of families, nor did they label it as a coercive 
measure.  Indeed, both right and left argued that the proposal did not 
imply coercion.   
 
The leave did not get a special name to distinguish it from the two 
weeks’ leave to which fathers were entitled immediately after the birth 
together with the mother.  Furthermore, the government did not launch 
comprehensive campaigns to encourage fathers to use this option as 
the Swedish and Norwegian governments had done.   
 
In 2001, parental leave and the daddy quota reappeared on the public 
agenda on 8 March, the International Women’s day.  It happened by 
coincidence, and it became highly politicised, because it triggered a 
pre-election debate, during which the Agrarian Liberal party together 
with the Conservatives challenged the Social Democratic coalition, 
which had been in office since 1993.  Hence, the upcoming election 
constituted the policy window that opened for politicising a new 
decision.  It was a new phenomenon that gender equality occupied a 
central position in an election debate, since it had for decades been 
almost non-existent as an electoral issue.3  The leading oppositional 
party, the Agrarian Liberals, saw the issue as a means to profile itself 
as an alternative to the Social Democrats, who headed the 
government.  By supporting a central welfare policy, the Agrarian 
                                                 
3  When the election was called in October, the issue disappeared, and refugees and immigrants became 
the leading theme of the campaign. 
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Liberal party sought to reinforce a pro-welfare profile.  They also used 
the daddy leave as a tool to orchestrate a campaign framing the Social 
Democrats as old-fashioned and tutelary, and finally, the issue was 
chosen as a means to attract female voters who tended to prefer other 
parties.   
 
The notion of coercion became a dominant discourse of the Right.  
The arguments also drew on the strong resentment which is evoked in 
the Danish public when something is labelled as quotas.  Quotas and 
affirmative action is by far the most controversial gender equality 
instrument in Denmark.  Initially, the coalition parties were caught on 
their heels, because extending the parental leave violated central 
objectives to increase the labour supply and prevent a rise in public 
expenditures.  The Social Democrats were squeezed since they, who 
have been characterized as the primary architects of the Danish 
welfare state, opposed a welfare reform proposed by the right.   
 
They and their coalition partner yielded some months later after an 
intensive media debate, when the remaining seven parties all 
supported the proposal.  At this point, they engaged in a discussion of 
earmarking part of the leave for the fathers, as a way of distinguishing 
their proposal, but they were constrained by internal divisions.4  The 
parliamentary group was deeply divided over the issue.  The party’s 
spokespersons for labour market and social policy affairs and several 
ordinary members opposed the daddy leave in the media and framed it 
as coercion.  They labelled the Social Democratic minister of equal 
opportunities as a fundamentalist  because she was in favour of the so 
called 3-3-3 model, which had been adopted in Iceland, reserving 3 
months for the mothers, three for the fathers and three to be shared.  
The prime minister initially supported this model, but he retreated due 
to the opposition in the party.  The conflict that was generated within 
the party was by and large of a gendered nature.  The proponents were 
mainly women, and the opponents mainly men.  Gender conflicts 
within political parties are rarely exposed in Denmark, because unlike 
the sister parties in Sweden, the Danish party does not organize 
women’s caucuses within the party.  In this particular situation it 
                                                 
4  It was abandoned the same year, when a Social Democratic government took office. 
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became visible, since their disagreements were played out in the 
media.   
 
The media controlled the timing, when the issue was put on the 
agenda, but during the ensuing phases, the politicians and the political 
parties kept the process going due to the impending election.  An 
extraordinary number of politicians interfered on the issue as it 
overlapped three policy areas: social, labour market and equal 
opportunities policies and because the high politics status of the 
proposal brought out all the party leaders.  The process was not visibly 
marked by other actors.  The civil servants played a minor role, which 
is usual practice in the agenda setting phase, but in this case it was 
also due to the high politics nature of the issue and the upcoming 
election.  The media were critical opponents of the parties’ proposal to 
extend the parental leave, because it contradicted central political 
goals to reduce public expenditures and increase the supply of labour, 
but some journals systematically took over the coercive metaphoric as 
the dominant frame for the daddy leave.  Feminist organizations 
warned against the combined effect of prolonging the leave and 
abandoning the daddy quota, but it is noteworthy that men’s 
organizations did not voice support for the entitlements of fathers.  
These organizations have, however, mainly organized men on the 
issue of the rights of men at marital dissolution. 
 
The Agrarian Liberal and the Conservative Parties had outlined a 
strategy profiling themselves as parties that supported central welfare 
issues.  They presented themselves as a renewal, as a contrast to the 
old-fashioned policies of the government of the day.  Freedom of 
choice and welfare constituted the key framework in the Agrarian 
Liberals’ profiling, and they used the daddy quota to label the Social 
Democratic policy as coercion, guardianship and a limitation of the 
individual’s freedom of choice.  The Social Democrats did not in 
earnest profile themselves with an alterative interpretation of the 
coercive metaphoric, which should be viewed in light of the internal 
disagreement in the party.   
 
It was noteworthy that neither during the media debate in 2001 nor in 
the parliamentary debate in 2002 was the daddy leave presented as a 
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success.  The increase in the take-up rate of fathers that was stated in 
the introduction was never used as an argument for the earmarking.  
The figures were available at the national statistical office, but they 
were not included to inform the decision makers.  The newly elected 
conservative minister of gender equality even defended the 
abolishment of the daddy leave by arguing that the fathers did not use 
it.   
The focus on gender during the debate in 2001 points to a change 
since the 1990s when gender as noted above occupied a modest role in 
political debates.  This shift may also be traced in the rearticulation of 
a public private split in relation to work and family issues. 
 
 
The public-private split 
The mobilization of women and their increased parliamentary 
presence in politics from the 1960s and 70s has all over the Western 
world challenged the public-private divide, and it has been 
demonstrated that this divide is neither fixed nor unchangeable.  The 
new feminist movement which claimed that ‘the personal is political’ 
attempted to politicise the private sphere with a radical emancipatory 
project, and they managed to put issues like domestic violence on the 
political agenda in many countries.  
  
There was, however, considerable difference between different 
countries.  A public private dichotomy has permeated liberal societies 
and ideologies, and feminist scholars have analysed its liberal 
patriarchal legacy (Pateman, 1980).  They have demonstrated how this 
divide has constituted a barrier to women’s full citizenship (Lister, 
1997). 
 
In Scandinavian countries it lost some of its significance; a public-
private mix emerged when the welfare states expanded their 
responsibility for reproductive tasks and thereby strengthened their 
woman-friendly potential (Hernes, 1987; Siim, 2000).   
 
The process is, however, by no means a gradual or automatic process 
that works one way, and discursively political parties especially from 
the right have from time to time rearticulated gendered divisions of 
care and breadwinning.  In 1974, the Danish prime minister Poul 
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Hartling, who was also the leader of the Agrarian Liberal Party, 
argued that strengthening girls’ interests in vocational training, 
changing the distribution of household tasks between spouses, and 
strengthening women’s interest and motivation for participating in 
organizational work were not a governmental concern, or was an 
aspect which could not be enhanced through legislative action 
(Folketingstidende, 25 October 1974).  During the following years, the 
integration of women in vocational training and organization matters 
was indeed considered central to governmental policies, and as noted 
earlier public childcare facilities have been expanded drastically.  On 
the other hand, the historical analysis has revealed that the caring role 
of fathers within marriage has been subject to a relatively weak 
politicization in Denmark, compared to the other Scandinavian and 
Nordic countries.  During the 1980s and 1990s, the political 
disagreements about statutory rights of fathers were largely framed as 
disagreements on economic priorities, and it did not revoke major 
ideological battles about the public-private split. 
   
In 2001, the abolishment of the daddy leave did, however, trigger a 
discursive battle on limits to public interference and a public private 
split was rearticulated as a means of profiling the right from the 
centre-left in Danish politics.  Politicians from the centre-right parties 
voiced concurrently that it was not a task for the public sector to 
influence the division of labour by gender, and the daddy leave was 
interpreted as politicians invading people’s privacy.  The Social 
Democratic Party was inhibited due to internal disputes over gender 
equality as a parameter in the legislation and did not challenge the 
predominant opposition on this issue.  The trade union movement was 
also divided with regard to the subject.   
 
Yet, discourse and practice are not necessarily in accordance.  The 
family has been subject to numerous regulations since this time, and 
the current government has gone considerably further by setting an 
age limit at 24 for marriage between Danish citizens and non-citizens.  
Furthermore, it has not been problematized that parental leave is 
premised on female responsibility for small children, since a relatively 
long period of the parental leave is earmarked for the mother.  The 
first two weeks after the birth are mandatory for women, and after 
 18
this, twelve weeks are reserved for the mother.  Historically, the 
arguments for this has been considerations for the recovery of the 
mother and the focus on promoting breastfeeding, but it is noteworthy 
that the Danish leave today has the most gendered construction in the 
Nordic countries, since it has the relatively longest period earmarked 
for the mother.   
The rearticulation of the public-private split in relation to the daddy 
leave was chosen strategically to profile the right wing parties in 
relation to the Social Democratic party, and the upcoming election 
was the factor that opened the policy window and triggered the 
discursive battle.  Another explanation for this development is the 
character of Danish policies of gender equality.   
 
 
Gender equality policy paradoxes  
The narrow Danish gender equality project may be explained by the 
disadvantageous opportunity structures that shaped policies of equal 
opportunities in the initial phase.  These policies do not enjoy strong 
support, neither in the political parties, nor in the population at large.  
It is not likely that this development will be reversed, also because the 
feminist movement has disappeared.   
 
Danish welfare policies still secure women’s economic autonomy, and 
traditional family policies never gained a strong foothold in Denmark.  
The government appointed a new minister of family affairs in 2004, 
but it remains unclear whether this signals new policy measures or 
mainly governmental concern about the problems with reconciling 
work and family that especially women are concerned about.  The 
norm of female breadwinning and dual income earner family 
structures has become a hegemonic and most likely also an 
irreversible norm.  The care of small children will remain on the 
political agenda for the years to come, but it remains to be seen 
whether fathers will organize not only on the rights to care at marital 
dissolution, but also within marriage.   
 
During later years, new challenges and cleavages have surfaced, and 
this has generated new gender equality paradoxes.  For the first time 
in several decades, the right profiles itself on gender equality.  This is 
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related to the fact that the situation of refugees and immigrants has 
been placed high on the political agenda.  The parties in government 
argue together with the extreme right that especially Muslim groups 
do not comply with the Danish norms of gender equality.  In this way 
these parties seek to profile themselves on a gender-political agenda 
that does not require significant policy initiatives.  The centre-left has 
adopted a defensive strategy because it is internally divided on the 
question, and furthermore these parties do not know how to tackle the 
recognition of difference between ethnic groups and equality between 
the genders at the same time.   
 
It is very likely that this paradox that the right wing parties, which 
have not profiled themselves on gender equality for many years, 
during the past five years have articulated a strong concern for gender 
equality among the ethnic minorities, will persist during the coming 
years.  It remains to be seen whether the centre-left manages to 
promote a vision for gender equality, or whether the right has taken 
the lead in terms of framing gender equality discourses.  It is, 
however, also clear that women have become a strategic electoral 
group, and this implies that all the political parties have to tackle 
issues like female representation and the gendered division of care and 
breadwinning.   
 
The abolishment of the daddy quota reveals that fight over meaning 
has become an integral part of the political game and the competition 
for electoral support.  If it is true that politics also is played out as a 
contest over meaning, it implies that things will not merely change if a 
new election brings a turn towards the left.  A re-adoption of daddy 
leave hinges on the ability of the centre-left to produce an alternative 
frame to the free choice rhetoric that became hegemonic during the 
debate in 2001.  Furthermore, unless the leave is extended further, 
which is not unlikely, it will be difficult to argue convincingly for 
earmarking a period for fathers, because it will be presented as 
curtailing women’s access to leave.   
 
The question remains whether the relatively weak institutionalisation 
of gender equality will lag behind as a social practice in Denmark.  
This may be the case in terms of political representation and women’s 
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top position and gendered practices in care of the newborn, but there 
are also indications that point in the direction of less pessimism.  First 
of all comparisons on welfare and family policy models rank Denmark 
relatively high in terms of achievements in gender equality (Korpi, 
2002).  Furthermore, comparative data on the attitudes of parents from 
the mid-1990s suggest that the support for egalitarian gender norms 
are stronger among Danish parents than Swedish and Norwegian, and 
they are also more optimistic in their evaluation of prevailing gender 
equality patterns (Ellingsæter, 1998).  This may of course relate to the 
hegemonic discourses of gender equality as an accomplishment, but 
seen together these findings may be interpreted as a sign of gender 
equality as a strong informal norm, especially among women.  
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the gender gap in party 
choice has been persistent.  Since the early 1980s, women vote more 
to the left than men, and the gender differences in political attitudes 
are even more pronounced.  During the 1990s, the gap between 
women’s support for economic redistribution and welfare benefits and 
men’s preference for tax reduction has become considerable, and it is 
today higher than ever.  The gender gaps are larger than in Sweden 
and Norway (Andersen & Goul Andersen, 2003; Mandag Morgen, 
2004).   
 
 21
References 
 
Andersen, J. and J. Goul Andersen (2003): ‘Køn, alder og uddannelse: 
Fe unge mænds sejr’, in J. Goul Andersen and O. Borre (eds.): Politisk 
Forandring: Værdiforandring og Nye Skillelinjer ved Folketingsvalget 
2001, Århus: Systime.   
 
Bacchi, C. (1999): Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of 
Policy Problems, London: Sage Publications. 
 
Biza, L. C., B. Krebs Lange and E. K. Lous, (1982): Ude og hjemme, 
Speciale, Historisk Institut, Aarhus Universitet.   
 
Borchorst, A. (1999a): ‘Equal Status Institutions’, in C. Bergqvist et al 
(eds.): Equal Democracies? Gender and Politics in the Nordic 
Countries, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, Nordic Council of 
Ministers, pp. 167-89. 
 
Borchorst, A. (1999b): ‘Gender Equality Law’, in C. Bergqvist et al 
(eds.): Equal Democracies? Gender and Politics in the Nordic 
Countries, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, Nordic Council of 
Ministers, pp. 190-207.   
 
Borchorst, A. (1999c): ‘Den Kønnede Virkelighed – Den Kønsløse 
Debat’, in J. Goul Andersen et al (eds.): Den Demokratiske Udfordring, 
København: Hans Reitzels Forlag, pp. 113-32.   
 
Borchorst, A. (2002): ‘Danish Child Care Policy: Continuity Rather 
Than Radical Change’, in S. Michel & R. Mahon (eds.): Child Care 
Policy at the Crossroads: Gender and Welfare State Restructuring, 
New York: Routledge, pp. 267-85. 
 
Borchorst, A. (2003): Køn, Magt og Beslutninger. Politiske 
Forhandlinger om Barselsorlov 1901-2002, Århus: Magtudredningen. 
 
Borchorst, A. (2004): ‘Skandinavisk ligestillingspolitik tur-retur, på 
dansk billet’, Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, no. 3-4, pp. 264-74. 
 
 22
Borchorst, A. and Dahlerup, D. (2003): Ligestillingspolitik som 
Diskurs og Praksis, København: Samfundslitteratur. 
 
Christensen, A.–D. and B. Siim (2001): Køn, demokrati og 
modernitet. Mod nye politiske identiteter, København: Hans Reitzels 
Forlag. 
 
Dahlerup, D. (1998): Rødstrømperne. Den danske Rødstrømpe-
bevægelses udvikling, nytænkning og gennemslag, 1970-1985, 
København: Gyldendal.   
 
Edelman, M. (1988): Constructing the Political Spectacle, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Ellingsæter, A. L. (1998): ‘Dual Breadwinner Societies: Provider 
Models in the Scandinavian Welfare States’, Acta Sociologica, vol. 
41, no 1, pp. 59-73. 
 
Fischer, F.and Forrester, J. (1993): The Argumentative Turn in Policy 
Analysis and Planning, Durham & London: Duke University Press.   
 
Folketingstidende (1974). 
 
Fraser, N. (1989): Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in 
Contemporary Social Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Hernes, H. M. (1987): Welfare State and Women Power. Essays in 
State Feminism, Oslo: Norwegian University Press.   
 
Kingdon, J. D. (1984): Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, 
New York Harper Collins College Publishers.   
 
Korpi, W. (2002): Velfærdsstat og Socialt Medborgerskab, Århus: 
Magtudredningen. 
 
Leira, A. (2002): Working Parents and the Welfare State. Family 
Change and Policy Reform in Scandinavia, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.   
 23
Mandag Morgen (2004): ‘Regeringen har tabt kvinderne og 1968-
generationens børn’, 24 August.   
 
Leira, A. (2002): Working Parents and the Welfare State.  Family 
Change and Policy Reform in Scandinavia, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.   
 
Lister, R. (1997): Citizenship.  Feminist Perspectives, Macmillan 
Press ltd. 
 
OECD (2001): Employment Outlook, Paris: OECD.   
 
Pateman, C. (1989): The Disorder of Women, London: Polity Press.   
 
Siim, B. (2000): Gender and Citizenship. Politics and Agency in 
France, Britain and Denmark, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Stone, D. (1988): Policy Paradox and Political Reason, Harpers 
Collins.   
 
Thelen, K. (1999): ‘Historical institutionalism in comparative 
politics’, Annual Review of Political Science, no 2, pp. 369-404.   
 
 
 24
Publications in FREIA’s paper series: 
 
1. Karin Widerberg: Udfordringer til kvinneforskningen i 1990'erne - föredrag på 
Center for Kvinneforskning i Aalborg 10.5.90, 1992 
 
2. Feminist Research. Aalborg University. Report 1976-1991, 1992 
 
3. Ann-Dorte Christensen: Kvinder i den nye fredsbevægelse i Danmark - mellem 
køkkenruller, resolutioner og teltpæle, 1992 
 
4. Ulla Koch: Uformel økonomi og social arbejdsdeling - en fortælling om 
tværfaglighed og det umuliges kunst, 1992 
 
5. Marianne Rostgaard: Kvindearbejde og kønsarbejdsdeling i tekstilindustrien i 
Danmark ca. 1830 - 1915, 1992 
 
6. Inger Agger: Køn og krænkelse - om politisk vold mod kvinder, 1992 
 
7. Margrethe Holm Andersen: Heks, hore eller heltinde? - et case-studie om 
tanzanianske kvinders politiske deltagelse og kønsideologier i forandring, 1993 
 
8. Ulla Koch: A Feminist Political Economics of Integration in the European 
Community - an outline, 1993 
 
9. Susanne Thorbek: Urbanization, Slum Culture, Gender Struggle and Women's 
Identity, 1993 
 
10. Susanne Thorbek: Køn og Urbanisering, 1994 
 
11. Poul Knopp Damkjær: Kvinder & rektorstillinger - et indlæg i ligestillings-
debatten, 1994 
 
12. Birte Siim: Det kønnede demokrati - kvinders medborgerskab i de skandinaviske 
velfærdsstater, 1994 
 
13. Anna-Birte Ravn: Kønsarbejdsdeling - diskurs og magt, 1994. 
 
14. Bente Rosenbeck: Med kønnet tilbage til den politiske historie, 1994 
 
15. Jytte Bang og Susanne Stubgaard: Piger og fysik i gymnasiet, 1994 
 
16. Harriet Bjerrum Nielsen og Monica Rudberg: Jenter og gutter i forandring, 1994 
 
17. Jane Lewis: Gender, Family and the Study of Welfare 'Regimes', 1995 
 
18. Iris Rittenhofer: A Roll in the Hay with the Director: The Manager in a 
Genderhistorical Perspective, 1995 
 
 
19. Ruth Emerek: On the Subject of Measuring Women's (and Men's) Participation in 
the Labour Market, 1995 
 
20. Maren Bak: Family Research and Theory in Denmark: A Literature Review, 1995 
 
21. Ann-Dorte Christensen & Birte Siim: Gender, Citizenship and Political 
Mobilization, 1995 
 
22. Hanne Marlene Dahl: Contemporary Theories of Patriarchy - Like a Bird without 
Wings? Power, Signification and Gender in the Reproduction of Patriarchy, 1995 
 
23. Lene Klitrose: Moving far beyond the Separated Fields of Patriarchal Scholarship: 
the Qualitative Leap of Philosophical Daring, 1995 
 
24. Ulla Koch: Omsorgsbegrebet i lyset af international økonomisk integration 
- begrebs- og metodediskussion, 1995 
 
25. Karen Sjørup: Patriarkatet og det kvindelige subjekt, 1995. 
 
26. Susanne Thorbek: Women’s Participation in Slum Organizations - Does it Make a 
Difference? 1995 
 
27. Mette Groes: Kvinder laver daghøjskoler for kvinder, 1995 
 
28. Signe Arnfred: Conceptualizing Gender, 1995 
 
29. Durre Ahmed: Essence and Diversity in Gender Research, 1995 
 
30. Ann Schlyter: Women’s Responses to Political Changes in Southern Africa  - 
Common Grounds and differences, 1995 
 
31. Diana Mulinari: Thinking about Feminism, 1995 
 
32. Susanne Thorbek: Global Context - Local Concepts, 1995 
 
33. Sylvia Walby: Key Concepts in Feminist Theory, 1996 
 
34. Yvonne Hirdman: Key Concepts in Feminist Theory – Analysing Gender and 
Welfare, 1996 
 
35. Anna Alten: The Incompatability of Entrepreneurship and Femininity: A 
Dilemma for Women, 1996 
 
36. Jane Lewis: Equality, Difference and Gender in Twentieth Century Welfare 
States, 1996 
 
37. Eileen Drew: Key Concepts Employed to Understand Gender in Relation to the 
Labour Market, 1996 
 
38. Ilona Ostner: Individualization, Breadwinner Norms, and Family Obligations. 
Gender Sensitive Concepts in Comparative Welfare, 1996 
 
39. Feminist Research. Aalborg University. Report 1996-1999, 1997 
 
40. Ruth Lister: Engendering Citizenship, Work and Care, 1997 
 
41. Ruth Lister: Citizen or Stakeholder. Policies to combat social exclusion and 
promote social justice in the UK, 1997 
 
42. Anne Showstack Sassoon: Beyond Pessimism of the Intelligence: Agendas for 
Social Justice and Change, 1997 
 
43. Lilja Mósesdóttir: Breaking the Boundaries: Women’s Encounter with the State in 
Sweden, Germany and the United States, 1997 Labour Market, 1996 
 
44. Ruth Emerek, Jeanette E. Dahl og Vibeke Jakobsen: Migrant Women on the 
Danish Labour Market, 2000 
 
45. Birte Siim: Dilemmas of Citizenship in Denmark – Lone Mothers between Work 
and Care, 1999  
 
46. Iris Rittenhofer: Historicizing the “Glass Ceiling”. The engendering of difference 
in German and Danish media presentations of leadershipdebates 1960 – 1989, 
2000  
 
47. Chiara Bertone: Familiens rolle i og kvinders krav til de sydeuropæiske 
velfærdsstater: et studie om Italien, 1999 
 
48. Margareta Bäck-Wiklund: Senmodernt familjeliv och föräldraskap – om 
tratitionella roller och nya identiteter, 2001 
 
49. Pernille Tanggaard Andersen: Retten til at vælge fællesskab – Yngre ufaglærte 
kvinders opfattelse af og praksis om fællesskab og solidaritet, 2002  
 
50. Birte Siim: Feministiske bidrag til politisk teori, 2003  
 
51. Anna-Birte Ravn: Economic Citizenship: Debates on Gender and Tax Legislation 
in Denmark, 1903-83, 2004 
 
52. Christina Fiig: En feministisk offentlighed – Ph. D-forelæsning, Aalborg 
Universitet den 23. september 2004 
 
53. Ann-Dorte Christensen: The Danish Gender Model and New Political Identities 
among Young Women, 2004 
 
54. Hege Skjeie: Trosfrihet og Diskrimineringsvern, 2005 
 
 
55. Kathleen B. Jones: Reflections on Violence and Gender in an Era of 
Globalization: A Philosophical Journey with Hannah Arendt, 2005 
 
56. Gunhild Agger: Køn i Matador og Krøniken, 2005 
 
57. Tina Kjær Bach: Kvinder i kommunanpolitik – rapport udarbejdet for Lige-
stillingafdelingen, 2005 
 
58. Birte Siim: Køn, magt og medborgerskab I en globaliseret verden, 2005 
 
59. Kirsten Sværke: Nyfeminisme og nye kønsidentiteter, 2005 
 
60. Anette Borchorst: Daddy Leave and Gender Equality – the Danish Case in a 
Scandinavian Perspective, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FREIA - the Feminist Research Centre in Aalborg is an interdisciplinary 
organization of feminist researchers at Aalborg University. Focus of the centre 
lies within the social sciences, especially the fields of anthropology, history, 
sociology/social science and political science. The present research programme 
“Gender and Social Change” forms the framework of a number of individual and 
collective projects. FREIA is part of the Institute for History, International and 
Social Studies at Aalborg University. 
 
  
